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Abstract: 
Given the ambitious goal of the European Union to achieve CO2 emission reduction, support to 
renewable energies, and increased energy efficiency a portfolio of different policies is going to be 
implemented or is already in place in the member states. These instruments have at least partly 
overlapping objectives; thus, a high degree of interaction is to be expected. In this paper we analyze 
how the EU ETS and renewable support mechanisms influence one another. We apply a static open 
economy computable general equilibrium (CGE) model of Germany incorporating different 
conventional and renewable generation technologies. We find that in case of an ETS with a green 
certificate trading scheme or a feed-in system the price for carbon drops to zero due to the high share 
of CO2-neutral renewable generation. Furthermore, the welfare reducing effect of an additional 
renewable support mechanism is rather low for both schemes. 
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1 Introduction 
The ongoing discussion about climate change and high fuel prices has fostered an intense debate about 
a more environmentally oriented policy. The European Union has taken a lead in supporting 
environmental policies to counteract climate change and to increase the utilization of renewable 
energies. The ambitious “20-20-20” goals postulate a reduction of greenhouse gas emission of 20%, a 
share of renewable energy sources of 20%, and an increase of energy efficiency of 20% by 2020. 
Emission trading, the promotion of renewable energies, and efficiency measurement, all contribute to 
the reduction of greenhouse gases and impact electricity market prices. However, the different 
instruments interact with one another and thus may improve or worsen the desired outcome. 
Furthermore, the specific support schemes for renewables vary for the EU member states. Although, it 
is generally agreed that an emission trading system is the least costs alternative for emission reduction 
there are reasons to incorporate additional support schemes for other market segments, like renewables 
or energy efficiency. However, the design of those policies has to take the interaction of instruments 
into account. 
In this paper we asses the interactions of an Emission Trading Scheme (ETS) with tradable green 
certificates and a feed-in system for renewable energies, respectively. We apply a numerical model of 
the German economy incorporating different conventional and renewable generation technologies and 
asses the impact of the different instruments on generation investment, electricity and emission 
allowance prices, the overall impact on other sectors, and the economy as a whole. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2 an overview about climate policy, 
renewable support schemes, and the interaction of both instruments is presented. Section 3 describes 
the underlying model; we apply a static open economy computable general equilibrium (CGE) model 
of Germany to analyze the interaction. The model is a combination of top-down and bottom-up 
modeling taking into account different generation technologies. In section 4 the scenarios and results 
are presented. After deriving the market benchmark representing the situation in 2004 we first analyze 
the impact of a pure emission trading scheme on generation investment and market prices. Afterwards 
the two renewable support schemes are implemented, respectively, assuming a target share of 20%. 
We find that in case of additional support of renewables the large share of CO2-neutral generation 
sources leads to an excess supply of permits and thus a carbon price of zero, making the ETS obsolete. 
The welfare impact of renewable support is negative due to a more costly generation mix. However, 
the impact is relatively small. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2 Tradable Emissions Permits and Renewable Energy Support 
Environmental policies aimed at energy markets often have overlapping objectives and interact to a 
specific degree. This is particularly the case for emission reduction policies and renewable support 
schemes but also effects energy efficiency targets (see Meran and Wittmann, 2008, and Sorrel and 
Sijm, 2005). In this section we provide a review on different mechanism to obtain greenhouse gas 
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reduction and present renewable support schemes. Afterwards the impact of both instruments on the 
different market segments is highlighted and the interaction is analyzed theoretically. 
2.1 Climate Policy 
The main aim of climate policy is to internalize the external costs of climate change caused by 
greenhouse gas emissions. Restricting ourselves to the class of market based policy instruments either 
quantities or prices can be regulated. In the case of emission control either price of greenhouse gas 
emission is set using a tax instrument or the quantity is regulated by a classical cap-and-trade system. 
Similarly, the amount of renewable energy production can be regulated by using subsidies for 
renewable energies or setting a lower bound on renewable energy production.1 In order to achieve a 
Pareto optimal outcome, targets should be set in a way to equalize marginal costs and marginal benefit 
of regulation In the case of emission regulation, marginal abatement cost should equal the marginal 
benefit of emission regulation in terms of reduced climate impacts. In the case of renewable energy 
support the marginal cost are given by the increase in marginal cost of energy production. The benefit 
of renewable energy production is twofold: on the one hand emissions are reduced leading to reduced 
climate impacts. On the other hand, renewable energy technologies have strong learning effects and, 
therefore, decrease the cost of future emission regulation.  
Although the intersection of marginal costs and damage is the theoretic aim to achieve most practical 
and policy discussion focus only on the quantity of emission reduction (e.g. the Kyoto protocol) or the 
share of renewables. However, this does not alter he policy options to achieve this aim either by 
setting a price or by fixing the quantity. In this section we shortly describe the market based 
instruments used in practice. 
Emission Regulation 
With a Pigouvian taxes the price p of pollution is set whereas pollution quantity Q results from of the 
cost minimization considerations of the market participants. Given perfect information about the 
aggregated abatement cost curves the price p is set such that a specific target is implemented and, thus, 
ecologically efficient Since all agents face the same price of emissions, the tax leads o equalization of 
individual marginal abatement cost and is, therefore, cost efficient. However, abatement cost curves 
are hard to obtain in real world environments. Therefore, emission taxes raise the problem of high 
informational requirements in order to implement a specific target.  
Contrary to taxes with permits the total quantity Q of aggregated emissions is fixed. The carbon 
budget is subdivided into emission allowances which are traded at a market. The price of pollution p is 
the resulting market price. Firms have to own a permission in order to emit a specific quantity and thus 
will either abate emissions or buy emission permits whichever is the cheapest. Since permits set the 
upper emission quantity they are ecologically efficient. Furthermore, since all agents face the same 
                                                     
1 It is also possible to regulate renewable energy production by either imposing taxes on the production of non-renewable 
energy sources or using a cap-and-trade system for non-renewable energy setting an upper bound. This methods draw 
parallels to emission regulation. However, it has become standard to support renewable energy instead of regulation non-
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price, emission allowances are also cost efficient. Contrary to taxes the aggregated marginal abatement 
cost curve is not necessary to set the optimal price. Therefore, permits reduce the informative 
requirements. However, in a permit system the regulator/government has to allocate an initial amount 
of allowances to market participants. Although, the allocation will theoretically not affect the outcome 
in practice this issue is of particular relevance e.g. see Böhringer et al. (2005). 
In this paper we focus on the permit option as Europe has implemented an emission trading scheme 
for the electricity generation and energy intensive industries which makes further emission specific 
instruments obsolete. Emission trading mainly has an impact on electricity prices and thus an indirect 
effect on consumption and investment. In general emission trading increases the generation costs of 
fossil fueled generation sources particularly coal fired power plants. Depending on the price of 
emission allowances less CO2 intensive generation from gas or oil fired plants may become more 
favorable. The merit order change and the higher production costs lead to higher electricity prices 
which in turn lead to less electricity consumption and shall foster energy efficiency improvements. In 
the long run emission trading is supposed to lead to an investment shift in favor of clean and/or 
renewable energy sources. 
The effect of emission regulation on electricity generation is depicted in panel (b) of Figure 1. 
Compared to the no regulation case shown in panel (a), emission regulation increases the marginal 
cost of fossil fuel based generation. Since costs are increasing, the electricity price is increasing and 
demand is decreasing. The actual emission costs depend on the specific carbon content of the used fuel 
thus more CO2 emitting energy sources like coal have higher costs than “cleaner” fuels like natural 
gas. In case of auctioning permits or using tax regulation the expenses for emission allowances can be 
interpreted as government’s revenue. Depending on the revenue recycling mechanism these income 
could create a double dividend (e.g. Goulder 1995, Bovenberg 1999). 
Renewable Energy Support 
Renewable Energy support started in the 1970s and 1980s mainly as a result of the increasing oil 
prices and security of supply concerns. During that time support was focused on research and 
development of renewable technologies. Expenditures for research amount to about 200 million US$ 
per year in the US and Europe respectively (Blok, 2006). Since the 1990s the focus of support has 
shifted to the actual implementation of renewable energy sources (RES). In the European Union these 
ambitions gained legal ground with the White Paper in 1997 and the corresponding renewable 
directive in October 2001 stating an implementation goal for renewables of 12% for total energy and 
22% for electricity by 2010. However, the actual support mechanism to reach those goals is left to the 
national governments. 
Given the high import dependency of most industrialized countries secure energy supply plays a major 
role in governmental policies. Utilization of national (renewable) energy resources thus is a key 
element of those policies. Beside the security of supply concern the promotion of RES is justified by 
                                                                                                                                                                      
renewable production. The reason might be, that emission regulation is essentially taxation of conventional, fossil fuel base 
generation. 
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several means. As RES are CO2 neutral they are considered a valid option in the climate change 
prevention. Support for RES may lead to reduced pollution, and provides employment and investment 
opportunities (Gonzáles, 2007). Due the cost disadvantage of renewable energies compared to fossil 
fuels an implementation support normally leads to higher expenses for consumers either in increased 
taxes or direct markups on electricity prices. However, in the short run RES also tend to reduce 
electricity prices as they lead to a right shift of the merit order curve and thus lower the price setting 
marginal generator (the merit order effect). For the German wind capacities studies show that the 
wholesale electricity prices decreased about the same amount as final consumer prices increased due 
to the feed-in tariff (Sensfuß et al. 2007, Weigt 2008). On the other hand an increase of stochastic RES 
production like wind and solar has impacts on operating reserve requirements and back-up capacities 
(e.g. Luickx et al. 2008, Hoogwijk et al. 2007) and large scale implementation also impacts grid 
investment (e.g. Leuthold el al. 2008).  
Long term effects of RES on power plant investments and electricity prices have not yet been 
quantified. However, another argument for the support of RES is that an early promotion can foster the 
learning by doing effects and thus lead to reduced energy costs in the future. As these earnings are 
generally not taken into account by markets the need for governmental intervention can be justified. 
Rosendahl (2004) analyzes the issue of learning effects and technological change with respect to costs 
effective environmental policy highlighting the importance to take those effects into account when 
designing mechanism. Particularly if spillovers exist a pure free market solution may not provide the 
long term least cost solution. 
In principal there is a large variety of different support mechanism for RES. In Europe mainly quotas 
and feed-in tariffs, and in the US also production tax credits are applied (Palmer and Burtraw, 2005). 
We will focus our analysis on the first two methods.  
Feed-in tariffs (FITs) parallel to Pigouvian taxes in emission regulation. By setting a specific price p 
for renewable support the actual quantity is defined by market participants via their investment 
behavior. FITs guarantee the purchase of green energy by the system operator at a fixed price which in 
turn is subsidized by the consumers. The price can either be a premium on top of the electricity market 
price or a total payment for the delivered energy. Feed-in tariffs allow a differentiated support of 
different technologies. Generally, more costly RES like solar energy also have higher feed-in tariffs. 
The guaranteed returns reduce the investment risk for RES and thus this mechanism is effective in 
bringing large numbers of renewable capacities to the marker (e.g. 23 GW of wind energy in 
Germany). However, the differentiated tariffs also create a higher cost burden for consumers 
compared to a least cost investment of green technologies as a higher share of more costly capacities is 
utilized. Under perfect information it is possible to set the FITs in a way such that the imposed 
renewable energy share is implemented. 
Quotas or renewable portfolio standards are equivalent to the permit system of emission trading as 
they set an external target Q for the share of RES. In general, this system is combined with tradable 
green certificates (TGC). Either energy generators or consumers have to guarantee that the target share 
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is met by their sales or purchases by owning a corresponding amount of TGCs. Thus, RES generators 
receive the market price for the energy delivery as well as the certificate price. The market mechanism 
is supposed to increase competition and obtain the quota in a least cost way. However, this mechanism 
has a higher investment risk than feed-in tariffs as the resulting certificate price is uncertain. 
Furthermore, possible gains from learning effects in high costs technologies like solar are not utilized 
as these technologies will not penetrate the market without specified support schemes. As quotas 
define the minimum level of renewable energies they implement the renewable target for sure. Like in 
the case of emission regulation, the information requirements to implement a specific renewable share 
are lower for the quantity regulation approach.  
The effect of renewable support on electricity generation is shown in panel (c) of of Figure 1. Due to 
the granted subsidy, the marginal cost of renewable production is decreasing, the electricity price is 
decreasing due to the merit order effect, and, consequently, demand is increasing. The price reduction 
for RES can be interpreted as the amount of government spending on renewable support. Note that the 
refinancing issue has been neglected in the figure. In practice, feed-in tariffs are financed via taxes on 
the electricity price. Similarly, renewable quotas increase the cost of fossil fuel based generation since 
these technologies have to hold renewable certificates to fulfill the quota. Consequently, generation 
costs of fossil fuel based generation increases. Therefore, the price effect is ambiguous if refinancing 
is taken into account. 
Interaction of emission trading and support for RES 
Emission trading and renewable support mechanism partly fulfill the same objective: the reduction of 
greenhouse gas emissions. Furthermore, they are aimed at the same market segment. Thus, this 
interaction leads to synergies as well as conflicts. Gonzáles (2007) provides an overview of the current 
literature on the interaction between both instruments including theoretical studies and applied 
analyses. The typology of interactions between and ETS and other policy instruments can be classified 
into three groups according to Sorrel and Sijm (2005): direct interactions were several instruments 
directly affect the target groups (e.g. if a company takes part in an ETS and is subject to CO2 taxes); 
indirect interaction were instruments have a downstream effect on a target group (e.g. electricity 
consumers subject to an energy tax additionally face higher prices due to an ETS); and trading 
interaction were instruments influence themselves by a trading commodity (e.g. between the EU ETS 
and Kyoto allowances). Furthermore, they highlight the problem of double regulation of specific 
sectors and double counting of emissions.  
Independently whether the support mechanism is implemented via a price or quantity target the 
increases share of RES has a direct impact on the emission level. A larger share of RES reduces the 
demand for emission allowances and thus brings allowance prices and in turn electricity prices down. 
The principal interaction of emission regulation and renewable energy support in electricity generation 
is highlighted in Panel (d) of Figure 1. The renewable support scheme lowers the generation cost for 
renewable energy production. Since the increased renewable share lowers the share of fossil fuel based 
generation, demand for emission allowances and thus emission costs are decreasing. Therefore, the 
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increase of generation cost of fossil fuel based generation is less than in the case of pure carbon 
regulation (panel (b)). The overall effect on electricity prices and demand is ambiguous.  
Depending on the RES support mechanism the introduction of an ETS can also help to improve the 
competitiveness of RES. Jensen and Skytte (2003) and Skytte (2006) show that if either a RES and/or 
emission quota should be reached the optimal instrument design depends on the correlation of 
consumer prices and the respective quotas. If increased RES utilization leads to reduced prices only a 
RES quota should be applied to reach a RES target whereas a combination of ETS and RES support 
should be applied in case of a price increasing effect. If only an emission goal is to be reached a RES 
system should again be applied if it reduces consumer prices and a pure emission trading in the other 
case. If a combination of RES and emission quotas is to be reached either a pure RES support or a 
mixture should be applied but not a pure ETS scheme. 
Bräuer et al. (2001) provide a comparison of an isolated analysis of emission trading and green energy 
promotion with a combined analysis. They show that in the case of a closed coexistence like in a feed-
in tariffs scheme the increased share of RES leads to a reduced need for emission allowances and thus 
to lower prices. They highlight that an open coexistence with tradable green certificates and an ETS is 
the most beneficial solution for those market participants that have to fulfill the renewable and 
emission quota as on both markets prices are lower than in an isolated system. 
Figure 1: Effect of climate policy on electricity prices 
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3 Model and Parameterization 
Our model is a static open economy computable general equilibrium (CGE) model designed to 
investigate the interaction between tradable CO2 permits and different policies to promote renewable 
energies. CGE models have become standard in the analysis of economy wide policies (see Conrad, 
1994, Wing, 2007). Their main advantage is the concise representation of price dependent market 
interaction on the basis of microeconomic theory. 
The model is based on the German input-output table of the year 2004 (German Statistical Office, 
2008a) which identifies 71 industries and commodities. Furthermore, the German statistical office 
provides energy flows and emissions of the German economy (German Statistical Office, 2008b) 
which are used to construct physical energy flows corresponding to value flows of the input-output 
table and carbon emissions. In order to account for different carbon contents of fuels, energy 
commodities are represented in a disaggregated way. Remaining industries are aggregated along the 
NACE classification except energy intensive industries which are aggregated along Annex I of the 
European emission trading directive (Directive 2003/87/EC). Detailed aggregation is given in Table 1. 
Table 1 Production Sectors in the Model 
 Production Sector Code Aggregation 
Non-energy Agriculture AGR NACE A, B 
 Mining MIN NACE C 
 Manufacture MAN NACE D, F 
 Energy Intensive Industries EINT European emission trading directive 
 Services SER NACE G-H, J-P 
 Transport TRN NACE I 
Energy Electricity ELY  
 Coal COA  
 Natural Gas GAS  
 Crude Oil CRU  
 Refined Oil OIL  
 
Germany is treated as a small country with respect to international trade, i.e. world prices are not 
influenced by German trade activities. Following the Armington assumption (Armington, 1968) 
domestic produced and imported commodities are imperfect substitutes. The only exception is crude 
oil which is assumed to be an international homogenous commodity. In all scenarios the trade 
imbalance of the benchmark equilibrium is held constant. 
Beside material and energy, sectoral production takes capital and labor as input. Both primary factors 
are supplied inelastically by a representative consumer. Factors are homogenous and sectoral mobile 
but international immobile. Production in non-electricity sectors is modeled via separable nested 
constant elasticity of substitution (CES) functions. The production structure is shown in Figure 3 in the 
Appendix. At the top-level, material inputs are combined with an aggregated of the composites value-
added and energy commodities in a Leontief manner. The value-added composite combines primary 
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factors capital and labor. The energy aggregate combines electricity and a fossil fuel aggregate.2 At the 
bottom level, each fossil fuel is combined with carbon dioxide according to its carbon content. 
Substitution elasticities are listed in Table 4 in the Appendix. 
For a detailed modeling of the electricity sector it is necessary to represent different electricity 
generation technologies. The production structure of the electricity sector is depicted in Figure 4 in the 
Appendix. At the top level, electricity generation is combined with an aggregate of the value-added 
composite and material inputs. Generation technologies are represented using the combined top-down 
bottom-up modeling approach (Böhringer, 1998, Böhringer and Rutherford, 2008). Each technology is 
characterized by a Leontief unit input vector of capital, labor, and fuel input. The unit inputs vectors 
are derived from engineering bottom-up studies which are calibrated to fit into the top-down input-
output framework using the method proposed by Wing (2006). Each technology is associated to base, 
mid, or peak load. A list of technologies input vectors, their respective load segment, and benchmark 
output is given in Table 1. The table also provides cost disadvantage for initially inactive technologies 
in form of markups as well as exogenously imposed capacity limits due to technological and political 
constraints (BMU, 2007). 
Within the load patterns technologies are perfect substitutes. The perfect substitutability assumption 
leads to a problem known as flip-flop behavior: small changes in relative prices lead to extreme 
changes in the technology structure of electricity generation. To avoid these unrealistic reactions, we 
use a CES function with a high substitution elasticity of 10 to combine electricity output of 
technologies in the specific load segments. The high elasticity results in isoquants which are nearly 
straight lines (perfect substitutes). However, the share preserving character of the CES function 
prevents technologies’ generation share not to react in an extreme manner (Wing, 2008). Capacity 
adjustments are modeled via technology specific capital stocks. The supply of technology specific 
capital provides an upper bound on the generation activity and, thus, is interpreted as technologies’ 
installed capacity. In turn, the price of the specific capital is interpreted as the rent on generation 
capacity which is different from the standard malleable capital rent. Capacity adjustment is governed 
by a constant elasticity of transformation (CET) function which takes malleable capital as input and 
provides technology specific capital as output (Wing, 2008). The value of transformation elasticity 
indicates how easy capacity can be adjusted. Since there are no empirical values of this elasticity we 
take it as 1 and perform sensitivity analysis. 
The representative agent maximizes utility subject to the budget constraint. The utility function is 
modeled as separable CES function (Figure 5 in Appendix). At the top level, a composite of energy 
commodities and other consumption commodities is combined with constant substitution elasticity. 
The energy composite aggregates electricity and fossil fuels, which are combined with carbon in a 
Leontief manner. Government consumption and investment demands are hold constant across 
scenarios and modeled with Leontief functions. 
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2 Crude oil does not enter the fossil fuel nest but is seen as an intermediate input.  
Table 2: Electricity Generation Technologies 
Technology Load Capital Labor Fuel Markup Output (TJ) Capacity Limit (TJ) 
Active Technologies 
Lignite Base 46.41% 19.47% 30.94%  579457 - 
Nuclear Base 59.44% 22.09% 15.40%  596346 596346 
Biomass Base 63.14% 34.27% -  41245 41245 
Other Base 58.11% 39.51% -  49327 49327 
Hard Coal Mid 37.50% 15.42% 43.75%  526995 - 
Natural Gas 
Combined 
Cycle 
Mid 16.32% 8.70% 71.38%  145363 - 
Wind Onshore Mid 74.70% 22.23% -  91658 245000 
Natural Gas 
Open Cycle Peak 32.91% 17.81% 46.04%  53335 - 
Oil Peak 25.57% 6.60% 64.15%  36520 - 
Water Peak 79.13% 17.62% -  100178 100178 
Inactive Technologies 
Coal CCS Base 63.39% 22.00% 11.53% 25%  - 
Hard Coal Base 37.50% 15.42% 43.75% 19%  - 
Natural Gas 
Combined 
Cycle 
Base 16.32% 8.70% 71.38% 19%  - 
Natural Gas 
CCS Mid 51.87% 20.00% 24.98% 15%  - 
Photovoltaic Mid 92.06% 4.15% - 150%  378000 
Wind Offshore Mid 77.5% 22.5% - 10%  534000 
Source: Authors own calculations based on Naini et al. (2005), Kaltschmitt et al. (2007). Markups of hard coal 
and combined cycle natural gas in base load are equal to average spread between base and mid load price at the 
European Energy Exchange (EEX) in 2004. Data of CCS technologies are taken from McFarland et al. (2004). 
Since shares net of taxes are presented, shares do not sum to one. 
 
4 Scenarios and Results 
Beside the business-as usual scenario (BAU), which replicates the German economy of the year 2004, 
we implement three different scenarios: First, the electricity sector and energy intensive industries are 
obliged to reduce their emission by 20%. Allowances trade between these sectors is allowed. Second, 
the scenario 20-20-uniform implements a 20% renewable energy quota for electricity generation on 
top of the 20% reduction target. Third, the scenario 20-20-differentiated also implements the 
additional 20% renewable generation target. However, a feed-in tariff is used to implement the target. 
Subsidies for renewable generation are differentiated by technologies and financed by a tax on 
electricity sector output. Each renewable technology receives a basic subsidy multiplied with a 
technology specific multiplier. The differentiation is oriented towards the German feed in tariff system 
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(EEG, 2008): onshore wind power is rewarded with the base subsidy, biomass generation gets 127%, 
offshore wind power 141%, and photovoltaic 467% of the base subsidy. 
Table 3 shows the impact of the different policy instruments on the electricity sector and on carbon 
prices. In the 20% emission reduction scenario, the carbon price becomes 3.43 €/t CO2. This leads to a 
cost increase and, thus, the electricity price increases by 2.16%. The higher prices lead to a decrease of 
electricity demand and, therefore, of electricity supply. Figure 2 and Table 5 in the Appendix show the 
impact on the technology mix in electricity generation. Due to the carbon constraint, conventional 
generation becomes more costly. Thus, offshore wind energy becomes competitive and enters the 
technology mix. Since wind energy enters the mid load segment, generation from hard coal is 
decreasing. In contrast, the share of the more polluting lignite production remains nearly constant. The 
reason behind this counterintuitive result lies in the fact that lignite is generating in the base load 
segment. However, except CCS which does not become competitive, there is no less carbon intensive 
alternative in base load since nuclear, biomass, and other generation are not allowed to increase 
further. The welfare impact of the 20% emission reduction of the electricity and energy intensive 
sector is slightly negative. 
Surprisingly, imposing a renewable quota of 20% in addition to the emission reduction leads to a 
carbon price of zero. Due to the high share of renewables in electricity generation, the electricity 
sector already avoids 37% of its emissions. Therefore, the imposed carbon constraint becomes non-
binding and the price drops to zero. Put differently, the high target of renewable generation leads to 
excess supply of emission allowances and, thus, to a zero emission price. Independently whether 
uniform or differentiated feed-in tariffs are used, the electricity price is decreasing compared to the 
pure reduction scenario. Accordingly, electricity demand is also increasing leading to a higher 
electricity supply compared to the 20% reduction scenario. Both renewable policies lead to a higher 
welfare loss than the pure reduction scenario since electricity producers deviate from their cost 
minimizing generation portfolio. This effect is only slightly more negative for the case of 
differentiated feed-inn tariffs.  
The reason for the nearly equal performance of the different renewable policies is revealed in Figure 2 
and Table 5 in the Appendix. Independent of the instrument used, the renewable quota is fulfilled by 
using offshore wind energy. Like in the pure reduction scenario, this leads to a decline of generation 
from hard coal. Even with a high feed-in tariff for PV in the differentiated scenario, this technology 
does not become competitive. Comparing the technology mix under uniform and differentiated feed-
ins shows that slightly more onshore instead of offshore wind energy is used in the case of 
differentiated feed-ins. This deviation from the cost efficient generation portfolio under a uniform 
renewable subsidy causes the slightly more negative welfare impact. 
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Table 3: Carbon Price, Electricity Price, Supply, and Demand 
 20% Reduction 20 –  20 Uniform 20 – 20 Differentiated 
Carbon Price (€/t CO2) 3.43 0.00 0.00 
Electricity Price (% vs BAU) 2.16 1.11 1.12 
Electricity Demand (% vs BAU) -1.08 -0.72 -0.72 
Electricity Supply (% vs BAU) -1.60 -0.99 -1.00 
Welfare (HEV % vs BAU) -0.0019 -0.0209 -0.0213 
 
Figure 2: Electricity Production by Technology Compared to BAU (in %) 
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5 Conclusion 
In this paper, we analyze the interaction of tradable emission permits and different support 
mechanisms for electricity generation from renewable energy sources, i.e. uniform quota system and 
differentiated feed-in tariffs. Using a top-down computable general equilibrium model which 
incorporates bottom-up features for electricity generation, we imposed a 20% emission reduction 
target for the electricity and energy intensive sector together with a 20% quota for electricity 
production from renewable energy sources.  
From our results we draw two major conclusions: First, supporting renewable energy leads to a 
decreasing carbon prices and, thus, also decreasing electricity price since the increased share of 
renewables decreases demand for carbon permits. In the extreme situation shown in this paper, the 
imposed renewable quota leads to excess supply of carbon permits and, in turn, to a zero carbon 
permit price. This result has an import implication for policy design: if renewable targets are set too 
tight, carbon regulation becomes redundant, i.e. the implementation and administrative cost of carbon 
trading are spent without any benefit. The argument is valid the other way around, too: imposing strict 
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carbon regulation could lead to a renewable share exceeding the proposed renewable quota and, thus, 
feed-in or tradable green certificates schemes are superfluous. With an eye on the proposed 20-20-20 
target of the EU which furthermore includes an improvement of economies’ energy efficiency by 
20%, this interaction becomes even more important.  
Second, imposing a renewable quota on top of an emission trading system, leads to a further welfare 
loss. In the case of a support scheme differentiated by technologies, the welfare loss becomes even 
larger. Therefore, an additional renewable quota and the differentiation of the support scheme have to 
be justified. Learning effects are the standard justification of renewable energy support. Generally, it is 
agreed that there are learning effects for renewable generation technologies. Therefore, a uniform 
support scheme for renewable energies points into the right direction. However, differentiating such a 
system by technologies needs to be justified by different learning rates. However, these rates are 
generally unknown and hard to estimate. Therefore, an efficient differentiation seems to be impossible. 
Furthermore, if renewable support schemes are justified on the base of learning effects, then the same 
argument applies for other emerging technologies which are not renewable but supposed to have 
learning effects, like CCS technologies. 
The obtained results are highly sensitive to the assumptions about the cost-disadvantages of new 
technologies. Particularly the low allowance prices are a consequence of the large share of offshore 
wind capacities installed. This large offshore generation is a result of the optimistic assumption of an 
20% cost-disadvantage of offshore wind compared to other mid-load technologies. Further analysis is 
necessary to gain insights on the impact of different assumptions regarding technology. 
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Appendix 
Figure 3: Production Structure Except Electricity Sector 
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Figure 4: Production Structure Electricity Sector 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Utility Structure 
 
 
 
Table 4: Substitution Elasticities 
Elasticity Value Description 
Production 
σVAE 0.4 Values added and energy aggregate 
σVA 1 Primary factors capital and labor 
σENE 0.5 Electricity and fossil fuel aggregate 
σFOF 1 Different fossil fuels 
σGEN 0.1 Different load segments in electricity production 
   
Utility 
σC 0.25 Other and energy consumption 
σOC 0.3 Other consumption commodities 
σCENE 0.4 Energy commodities 
   
Trade 
σDM 2 Combines domestic and imported commodities (electricity: 0.3) 
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Table 5: Generation Shares by Technologies (in %) 
 BAU 20% Reduction 20 - 20 Uniform 20 - 20 Differentiated 
Lignite 24.0 24.2 24.0 24.0 
Nuclear 25.5 25.4 25.1 25.2 
Biomass 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 
Other 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 
Hard Coal 22.9 18.0 14.6 14.6 
Natural Gas CCGT 7.0 7.4 3.1 3.1 
Wind Onshore 6.0 6.4 5.5 6.0 
Wind Offshore 0.0 3.9 13.2 12.7 
Hydro 7.5 7.6 7.3 7.3 
Natural Gas OCGT 3.5 3.3 3.6 3.6 
Oil 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.2 
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